Review of Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman’s Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century

There once was a time when dictators were responsible for the deaths of millions of people. Not so long ago, dictators controlled all aspects of their citizens’ lives, including who they spoke with, what they consumed, how they dressed, and who they revered. Above all, people feared these dictators. The twenty-first century, however, is a strange time for dictators. There is a new brand of spin dictators.

Unlike in the past century or so, these spin dictators have ditched their military uniforms for Western suits, seldom use military force, refrain from using violence, do not censor information, do not execute political opponents in football stadiums, and, most importantly, even permit opposition parties and hold elections. All of this sounds at once like an established democratic society. But as it happens, that isn’t the case.

In a new book titled Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21^st Century, political scientists Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman distinguish between “fear dictatorships”, a classical model that relied on violent terror to enforce societal order, and “spin dictatorships”, a new form that foregoes violence and instead relies on subtle acts of popularity and propaganda.

In contrast to the fear dictators of the past, such as Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and Idi Amin, modern dictators deceive people into compliance and support by spinning facts and beliefs about the world. In this sense, spin dictatorship is built on the fiction that “the dictator is a competent, benevolent democrat”.

Political scientists have shown us that most autocracies hold elections in recent years.  Based on a detailed study of over 35 cases across societies in their influential book on competitive authoritarianism, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have further shown that these elections are not wholly unfree—and sometimes, the opposition party candidates win seats. Guriev and Treisman build on these ideas and suggest an overarching logic to the spin dictatorship.

The early manifestations of the spin dictatorship were tried and tested in Singapore. Lee Kaun Yew’s authoritarian model did not endorse violent repression. Lee even considered violence as the failure of governance. Rather than relying on violent repression, Lee’s approach placed subtle restrictions. In this instance, a newspaper ran the risk of its circulation being capped for offending the government. Protests were allowed only with license and police permits. Opposition leaders attended parliaments, but false defamation cases could bankrupt them.

After Lee, his successors, Goh Chok Tong (1981–2003) and Lee Hsien Loong (2004–), embraced the existing spin model. Moreover, Lee’s model had already spread across Asia and Europe, where rulers were already using libel and defamation lawsuits to harass journalists and opposition leaders.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, with ruling elites substituting the old governance model with new ones, Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev embraced Lee’s approach.

In contrast to the Stalinist propaganda of the USSR, Nazarbayev adopted “promise-packed speeches”, much like a national CEO or country manager, introducing new objectives and initiatives like ‘Kazakhstan 2030’, and ‘100 Concrete Steps to Implement Five Institutional Reforms’. Subtle propaganda was used in each case to demonstrate that the leader was making a positive impact on people’s lives and performing well.

For spin dictators to stay in power, popularity is crucial. These autocrats carefully curate approval ratings. To sustain their approval ratings, they buy off media outlets, co-opt critics, encourage self-censorship, and sometimes even rhetorically dismiss the critics as Western agents.

They manufacture good economic performances and claim credit for them. And now that everyone has a smartphone and access to the internet, they even produce a ton of technopop songs that praise them and their macho-man persona. In this context, Guriev and Treisman write: “If Stalin was god, Putin has become a trademark”.

However, all forms of press censorship can turn detrimental. As a result, these leaders occasionally allow criticism to give the impression to citizens that the media is generally free. In Venezuela, for instance, Chavez had decided to keep just one opposition TV on air.

Spin dictators pretend to pose as democrats. Once every five years, these dictators hold elections. These elections are curated to demonstrate public approval of their leadership and support for their system. Even though voters and opposition leaders can cast ballots in these elections, the ruling dictator usually wins by a landslide.

Guriev and Treisman add: “These landslides are supported—and magnified—by media manipulation, gerrymandering, and a dose of electoral fraud.” These autocrats use the power of the vote to their advantage by manipulating the outcome of a vote.

In an increasingly globalised world, spin dictators have opened their economy and society to the outside world. These autocrats welcome the flow of people, capital, and data into their countries. They open their borders so that people can travel without fear. They let their citizens travel abroad, work hard, and send remittances home. They even join international political and economic institutions. Importantly, they co-opt Western allies and use lobby groups to secure their interests whenever these things backfire.

In essence, spin dictators tend to disdain violent repression, fix their popularity through ratings, conduct elections in pretending to be democratic, and integrate with the world outside to secure their interests.

Contrary to the view that modernisation would cause the rise of democracies, Guriev and Treisman’s thesis shows that modernisation itself has allowed autocrats to innovate and learn new ways of governing and staying in power. It is a refreshing take.

However, just as I read through the chapters in this book, I could not help but feel that the majority of these features applied to the Indian situation. In contemporary India, there exists a pervasive crackdown on journalists and human rights advocates, restrictions on minority rights to facilitate right-wing ascendance, substantial influence of political elites over media establishments, and the targeting of opposition leaders in corruption cases.

Even as Orbán’s Hungary features as a spin dictatorship, Modi’s India is not mentioned once (and in that context, Kapil Komireddi’s Malevolent Republic offers a fantastic alternative!)

Moreover, has the distinction between democracy and dictatorship become less clear, given the rapid decline in democratic societies and their trend towards authoritarianism? Or does it also mean that, with technological advancements and state entrenchment in people’s lives, democracies have taken authoritarian roots, and authoritarian regimes have taken the democratic roots? These questions are left for others to dwell deeply into.

Nonetheless, the book is lucidly written, immensely readable, and highly recommended.